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Introduction: a spectrum of public participation 
This article critically analyses the consequences of different levels of public participation in decision-
making processes for chronically disadvantaged and marginalised people. The International 
Association for Public Participation (IAP2) Spectrum of Public Participation (2007) lists five levels of 
participation. At one end of the spectrum is a top-down process of dissemination, which entails only 
informing people about a proposed policy; participants listen rather than contribute. Next is 
consultation, which seeks both to inform and to elicit public opinion. In the middle of the spectrum 
is involvement, which seeks to incorporate public concerns in decision-making processes. Next 
comes collaboration, viewed as a decision-making partnership. And at the other end of the spectrum 
is empowerment, in which participants have final responsibility for decision-making. Social scientists 
have long engaged critically with the deployment of participatory methods in development and 
displacement in particular, but their critiques often do not sufficiently disaggregate according to the 
various levels of participation on the IAP2 spectrum.  
 
This article presents a case study of one of these five possible levels of participation for 
governmental decision-making in the UK: a ‘community consultation’ commissioned by the UK 
Government on the feasibility of resettlement of the Chagos Archipelago, a remote British Overseas 
Territory in the Indian Ocean whose inhabitants were forcibly removed in the 1960s and 1970s. In 
the UK Government’s Consultation Principles (HMG 2013), non-legally binding guidelines on how UK 
departments and agencies should conduct public consultation exercises, the UK Government 
emphasises the importance of selecting methods of engagement appropriate to the potential 
impacts of the proposal or decision being made and the stakeholder groups affected. The Principles 
advocate “achieving real engagement rather than merely following bureaucratic process” (HMG 
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2013: 1) by commencing consultation in the early stages of policy development to enable the 
genuine input of stakeholders into decision-making, considering the timing and duration of 
consultation, being clear about benefits, costs, and scope of influence, ensuring that the 
consultation is accessible to target audiences, minimising the burden on participants, and giving 
feedback to participants (HMG, 2013). But how do these guidelines relate to actual practice of 
community consultations? 
 
The Chagossian case is a complex one. The UK Government has a long and troubled history of 
entanglements with the Chagossian community. We argue that the UK Government and the 
consultants it commissioned failed to engage with this complex history, because, contrary to the 
Consultation Principles (HMG, 2013), they approached consultation as a standardised, depoliticised 
and dehistoricised fact-finding exercise. This led to particular challenges in establishing trust 
amongst community members and diminished the effectiveness of the consultation process. Using 
this case study we show that far from neutral, one-off fact finding endeavours which inform the 
development of policy, public consultations are politically loaded exercises that have lasting 
consequences for communities in terms of power, participation, and vulnerability. Our argument has 
both theoretical and policy implications. Firstly, in terms of the IAP2 Spectrum of Public 
Participation, the level of participation entailed in consultation is insufficient for the inclusion of 
chronically disadvantaged and marginalised communities in processes of decision-making that will 
affect their lives. Secondly, and consequently, those involved in commissioning or conducting 
participatory projects should pay careful attention to the historical, political, and socio-economic 
dynamics of communities in question with a view to determining instances in which more 
collaborative or empowering methods (than merely dissemination, consultation, or involvement) 
may be required to ensure an equitable – and effective – public participation process.1 
                                                          
1 In this article we focus on the consultation process rather than the substantive content. 
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The rise of participatory methods and community consultation 
After the Second World War, Third World development was principally conceived as the top-down 
delivery of resources for infrastructure and industrialisation (Chambers, 1995: 30; Nelson & Wright, 
1995: 2). However, top-down projects that did not incorporate local concerns were not ideally 
placed to address local development needs. From the failures of such projects came the insight that 
local participation in development projects could lead to empowerment and sustainability 
(Chambers, 1995: 30; Nelson & Wright, 1995: 3). Similarly, in the field of development-induced 
displacement and resettlement, there was increasing recognition that the loss of control over where 
and how one lives is particularly disempowering (Colson, 1989; de Wet, 2006), and that relocation is 
more likely to be successful if it is well planned in advance and involves affected people in decision-
making processes (Cernea, 1996: 27-30). The systematic involvement of people affected by project 
implementation or outcomes has become the rule rather than the exception for demonstrating fair, 
responsible, and legitimate decision-making in development and resettlement alike, but top-down 
design, implementation, and resource delivery, and inadequate community engagement, remain 
widespread (Chambers, 1995: 32; de Wet, 2006: 185-186; Turton, 2003). Similarly, since the 1990s 
the form of participation known as public consultation has become a central component of 
governmental policy-making processes in the UK, and is conceptualised as a means by which 
participants can exercise their political rights and build social capital, thus enhancing democracy and 
active citizenship (Head, 2011; Barnes et al, 2004). State institutions rationalise the practice of 
consultation on various grounds: normative (because it is seen as a desirable and proper process to 
undertake in and of itself), substantive (to achieve better ends such as good quality decisions), and 
instrumental (as a means of achieving specific goals such as enhancing the legitimacy of decisions) 
(Fiorino, 1990; Petersen, 2007; Maciejewski Scheer & Höppner, 2010).  
 
Meanwhile, however, social scientists have shown that participatory methods are beset with myriad 
methodological and ideological challenges. In development settings, agencies may have a financial 
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rather than ideological motivation for participation because participation deploys local labour time, 
thus transferring the burden of project costs from the agency to the intended beneficiaries 
(Chambers, 1995: 30; Nelson & Wright, 1995: 15-16). Particularly under a project’s strict timeframes, 
hurried participation can reproduce and strengthen existing power structures, and homogenise the 
differences within putative categories such as young men, women, or poor people (Chambers, 1995: 
39; Gardner & Lewis, 1996: 112-113; Nelson & Wright, 1995: 15; Schrijvers, 1995). With overly 
structured participatory discussion, ideas may be imported into a stakeholder community and then 
attributed to them (Gardner & Lewis, 1996: 111). Routinised participation can become a cosmetic 
label whereby governments or development agencies go through the motions without truly 
engaging with stakeholders (Chambers, 1995: 41; Gardner & Lewis, 1996: 111).  
 
Some critics argue that there is little evidence that participation has brought about sustained 
empowerment or a material improvement in the conditions of the most vulnerable (Woost, 1997: 
230; Cleaver, 1999: 598; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Kumar, 2002; Hickey & Mohan, 2004: 3). They see 
the depoliticisation of participation, its conceptualisation as a purely technical approach, as a major 
obstacle to challenging the causes of inequality and achieving political transformation. Similarly, 
critics of public consultation processes in the UK have pointed to their failure to reach marginalised 
groups or to achieve empowerment beyond the narrow scope of a specific policy decision or service 
provision (Percy-Smith, 2010). Nevertheless, even critics share a reluctance to do away with 
participation altogether, on the grounds that sensitive participation can enable vulnerable people to 
help determine the form and outcome of development initiatives, resettlement programmes, or 
government policies. Such critics argue instead for methodological reflection and improvement 
(Cook, 2002; Hickey & Mohan, 2004: 12; Eversole, 2012) and greater attention to issues of power, 
motivation, and legitimacy (Eversole, 2003). 
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Trust and mistrust in community consultation 
According the IAP2 Spectrum of Public Participation (2007), participants in collaboration and 
empowerment are expected to exercise considerable control over decision-making processes and 
thereby to influence outcomes. By contrast, processes of consultation and involvement require 
people to provide information that may be used in or against their interests, thus necessitating trust. 
As Gambetta (1988: 217-218) points out, questions of trust arise in conditions of uncertainty, 
particularly concerning the actions of others; we must trust because we can never have full 
knowledge of others, their motives and responses. Trust is necessary when other people have the 
ability to act freely and to disappoint our expectations. For Gambetta, trust is a subjective 
assessment that another person will act in one’s interests (or at least not against one’s interests) 
such that one would consider some form of cooperation with that person (Gambetta, 1988: 217). 
Trust may be a kind of confidence that interactional partners will not take advantage of one 
another’s vulnerability (Misztal, 2011: 362); this latter definition is perhaps more encompassing as it 
captures the fact that parties may be engaged in interaction or even cooperation without actually 
trusting one another (such as under conditions of limited autonomy). 
 
But how might people come to trust others? Colson (2003: 5-6) points out that good intentions 
alone do not earn trust, and cooperation in the present does not mean that trust cannot be broken 
in the future. The development of trust requires continuing links in the form of reciprocal 
relationships and expectations of a common future (Colson, 2003: 5). Displaced people in particular 
are often subject to increased control by outsiders (such as host governments assessing their claims 
and humanitarian agencies running refugee camps) whose exercise of authority is often maintained 
and legitimised by mutual mistrust (Voutira & Harrell-Bond, 1995: 209). Some have tended to see 
mistrust as pathological, impractical, and an impediment to the achievement of goals (Aguilar, 1984; 
Misztal, 2011), but there may be conditions under which the development of trust in others is 
neither desirable nor possible, with consequences for participation. In situations of uncertainty, it 
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may be that ‘withdrawal is a safer strategy than exposure and silence a better language of control’ 
(Knudsen, 1995: 26); non-participation may be a rational strategy or preferred course of action 
(Cleaver, 1999: 603-4). 
 
The development literature shows that both consultants’ actions and the culture of consultancy can 
be impediments to the development of trust. Eversole (2003: 788) and Mosse (2005: 78) have shown 
how mistrust can arise from opaqueness surrounding the consultants’ intentions in contexts of 
histories of unwelcome impositions by outsiders in Aboriginal Australia and Adivasi India 
respectively. Eversole (2003: 787) highlights the problem of ‘fly-in-fly-out consultants’ who are 
unfamiliar with community dynamics and therefore unable to identify the most appropriate people 
to engage. Stirrat’s (2000) auto-ethnography presents development/aid consultancy as a Western 
aesthetic performance. He suggests that the vast majority of consultants are employed on 
temporary contracts and come together (usually never more than once in the same configuration) to 
work for a set period of time (usually a matter of months), at a specific stage of the project cycle 
(rarely multiple stages), within a standardised structure (to a Terms of Reference document), 
culminating in the production of a specific output (the report). Usually, the impact of consultants’ 
work is not measured, and they are not held accountable for the results of their advice. Returning to 
Colson’s (2003) point about trust being founded upon reciprocity and a shared future, we apprehend 
that consultation exercises involving routinised performances by external, temporary parties may 
not provide conditions under which trust can flourish. In this article, we bring together critiques of 
participatory methods with social science work on trust in order to show how a failure by 
consultants to engage with histories of marginalisation, misrecognition, and mistrust can lead to 
selective participation and barriers to genuine participation within disadvantaged and marginalised 
communities. 
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The Chagos Archipelago, the Chagos islanders, and the UK Government 
The Chagos Archipelago was administered as a dependency of colonial Mauritius. French and British 
colonists populated the islands, first with enslaved labourers and later with contract workers. The 
population of Chagos rose steadily throughout the nineteenth century and hovered around a 
thousand over the first half of the twentieth century (Gifford & Dunne, 2014: 39-20). The UK 
Government has a long history of failing (adequately) to involve the Chagossian community in 
decision-making about the future of the Chagos Archipelago. 
 
In 1965, the UK Government excised Chagos from Mauritius to form part of the new British Indian 
Ocean Territory (BIOT) in order to make the Chagos Archipelago available for US defence purposes. 
Since 1971, the largest island, Diego Garcia, has been the site of a major US overseas military base.2 
Following the establishment of BIOT in 1965, and particularly from 1967 onwards, the UK 
Government depopulated the Chagos Archipelago without consulting with the Chagos islanders. The 
UK authorities first prevented the return of islanders who had gone on trips to Mauritius and 
Seychelles, then restricted supplies and wound down work on the coconut plantations, and finally 
coerced the remaining islanders onto crowded ships, which removed them from the islands. By 
1973, between 1,328 and 1,522 Chagos islanders had been relocated to Mauritius, and 232 to 
Seychelles (Gifford & Dunne, 2014: 46). No support was offered to facilitate settlement, and many 
Chagossian families have contended with chronic impoverishment and marginalisation in Mauritius 
and Seychelles. 
 
In 1972, the UK Government awarded the Mauritian Government £650,000 with which to 
compensate the displaced Chagos islanders, and this money was eventually distributed in 1978.3 
Chagos islanders demonstrated in the Mauritian capital Port Louis in 1980 and 1981 to demand their 
                                                          
2 Successive Mauritian governments have claimed sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago since 1980. The UK’s response is 
that Chagos will be returned to Mauritius only when it is no longer required for defence purposes. 
3 Chagos islanders in Seychelles have never yet received any compensation. 
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right of return to Chagos, immediate compensation, decent housing, and jobs. In 1982 the UK 
Government provided £4 million in compensation and the Mauritian Government contributed land 
valued at £1 million. The final instalments of cash were released in 1983 only on condition that the 
recipients would sign or thumbprint English-language ‘full and final’ renunciation forms to indemnify 
the UK Government (Madeley, 1985: 10). The fact that the forms were not adequately translated 
(into Kreol) or explained indicates that they were extracted without appropriate informed consent. 
Consequently, Chagossians became wary of putting their thumbprint or signature on untranslated 
written documents which they could not trust. 
 
In 1997, a series of hitherto secret notes between UK officials (made available under the 30 year rule 
in the Public Records Act) revealed that the UK Government knew at the time of the displacement 
that the islanders were a settled population – rather than transient contract workers as they had 
been portrayed at the time – and that uprooting them was contrary to international law 
(Marimootoo, 1997). The revelations laid the foundations of a case against the UK Government in 
the name of Olivier Bancoult, leader of the Chagos Refugees Group in Mauritius. In 2000, the London 
High Court ruled against the UK Government, which immediately implemented a new BIOT 
Immigration Ordinance, which theoretically entitled Chagossians to return to the Chagos Archipelago 
(except to Diego Garcia, which was excluded due to the military base there), although the UK 
Government provided no financial or logistical means to do so. 
 
The FCO had commissioned a feasibility study for the resettlement of Chagos. The consultants were 
not tasked or permitted to consult Chagos islanders, but did conduct a fieldtrip to two formerly 
settled Chagos atolls identified as potential resettlement sites (Posford Haskoning, 2002: 2-3). They 
concluded that the islands could support a small population on a subsistence basis with some 
commercial opportunity from fisheries and mariculture, but also noted that Chagos was vulnerable 
to existing natural and further climate change-induced flooding, and that accordingly the costs of 
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maintaining a long-term settlement would be prohibitive (Posford Haskoning, 2002: 24). A decade 
later, one of the consultants confirmed that FCO officials had pressurised the consultants to tone 
down their initial conclusion that resettlement was feasible, and the critical sections of the study 
have now been shown to be flawed (Gifford & Dunne, 2012). 
 
In 2004, the UK Government enacted a new BIOT Immigration Order-in-Council preventing non-
authorised persons (including Chagos islanders) from entering the entire territory. The Chagossians’ 
legal team won an application for judicial review in the Divisional Court in 2006 and the Court of 
Appeal in 2007, but lost in the House of Lords in 2008; their claim at the European Court of Human 
Rights was turned down in 2014. In June 2015, the Supreme Court heard an application to appeal 
the House of Lords decision. Meanwhile, Chagos islanders and most of their second-generation 
children became eligible for full UK citizenship under the British Overseas Territories Act 2002. Since 
2002, over two thousand members of the extended Chagossian community – i.e. Chagos islanders 
plus their partners, children, and subsequent generations – have emigrated from Mauritius and 
Seychelles to the UK, where they live in greatest concentrations in and around Crawley (West 
Sussex), Manchester, and London. 
 
In 2009, in response to a powerful campaign led by a coalition of conservation groups, the FCO 
launched a public consultation on whether to establish a Marine Protected Area (MPA) around 
Chagos (see Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009; Jeffery, 2013). The FCO’s consultation 
facilitator held ‘oral discussions’ that she reported had ‘reached’ 100-150 Chagossians in the form of 
face-to-face meetings in the UK and Seychelles and a videoconference with the elected 
representatives of the largest Chagossian group in Mauritius (Stevenson, 2010: 9). The majority of 
the several hundred Chagossians who responded to the consultation – mostly in Mauritius and 
Seychelles – opposed a no-take MPA around Chagos (Stevenson, 2010: 15). A significant minority of 
Chagossian respondents – primarily those in the UK – said they would only support a no-take MPA if 
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it incorporated exceptions for pelagic tuna and artisanal fishing by Chagos islanders (Stevenson, 
2010: 16). Numerically, however, the Chagossian response was insignificant in comparison to 
support for a no-take MPA from a quarter of a million signatories of on-line petitions organized by 
Avaaz, Care2, Greenpeace, and the Chagos Environment Network (CEN), a coalition of conservation 
organizations led by the Chagos Conservation Trust (CCT), which had launched the MPA campaign 
(Stevenson, 2010: 9-10). In 2010, the BIOT Commissioner declared what was then the world’s largest 
no-take (i.e. no fishing) MPA around the Chagos Archipelago. Thus in theory there was a community 
consultation, but the Chagossian contribution was marginalised and Chagossians felt that their 
perspectives were ignored in the final policy decision.  Subsequently, the Mauritian Government 
contested the MPA under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on the grounds that 
the United Kingdom did not have the jurisdiction to declare an MPA in this disputed territory. In its 
ruling in March 2015, the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration unanimously found that the 
declaration of the MPA was not compatible with the UK government’s obligations under UNCLOS 
with respect to Mauritian fishing rights, the eventual return of the territory to Mauritian sovereignty, 
and the rights of Mauritius to benefit from oil or mineral extraction activities in the region. 
Meanwhile, Olivier Bancoult, leader of the Chagos Refugees Group (CRG) in Mauritius, applied for 
judicial review of the MPA on the grounds inter alia that it was established with the ‘improper 
motive’ of preventing the islanders from returning to Chagos, as suggested by a diplomatic cable 
released by WikiLeaks (see Jeffery, 2014). 
 
In 2013, the UK Government launched a review of its policy on resettlement. The rest of this article 
is based on ethnographic fieldwork we conducted in Mauritius and the UK throughout the policy 
review process, as part of a larger anthropological research project on debates about the future of 
the Chagos Archipelago. In June and July 2013 we attended and recorded meetings between FCO 
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officials and Chagossian groups in Mauritius,4 Manchester, and Crawley; the FCO also met 
Chagossians in London and held a video conference with the Chagossian group in Seychelles. Shortly 
afterwards, the UK Government announced its intention to commission a new feasibility study into 
resettlement that would be ‘as fair, transparent and inclusive as possible’, guaranteeing that the full 
report would be published ‘without revision’ (unlike the previous feasibility study, which had been 
the subject of an extensive secret internal review, see Gifford & Dunne, 2012).5 The FCO circulated a 
summary of its consultations and its draft Terms of Reference (ToR)6 in November 2013, solicited 
feedback by December 2013, circulated its final ToR in January 2014, tendered in February 2014, and 
announced its selection of KPMG (one of the world’s largest consultancy firms) in March 2014. 
 
KPMG Feasibility Study for the Resettlement of the British Indian Ocean Territory 
The scope of the feasibility study was set out in KPMG’s inception report: a multi-disciplinary team 
would prepare an analysis of different options for resettlement, considering the likely cost to the UK 
government over 5, 10 and 20 years; whether and how resettlement could be economically self-
sustaining; and the risks and costs of mitigation (KPMG, 2014a: 1). At the outset, the study team 
included two KPMG employees with project management and support roles, and four contracted 
experts in international resettlement, environmental science, economics, and infrastructure 
respectively (KPMG, 2014a: 9-10). The study team would adopt ‘a “neutral” approach, starting 
afresh when analysing the expected costs and benefits of each resettlement option without being 
steered by the conclusions of others’, and conduct open consultation involving ‘structured 
consultation events’ in the UK, Mauritius, and Seychelles, and the elicitation of views by email 
throughout the process (KPMG, 2014a: 2). Structured consultation events would be carried out in 
June and October 2014: the first focused on gathering information, the second on cross-checking 
                                                          
4 The Mauritian Government declined to enter into discussions on the topic of resettlement because of the unresolved 
sovereignty dispute and its legal case against the MPA. 
5 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130708/wmstext/130708m0001.htm  
6 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/british-indian-ocean-territory-feasibility-study-draft-terms-of-reference  
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and verifying initial results, and gaining feedback on the provisional findings (KPMG, 2014a: 2). These 
activities were intended to establish how many people wished to return, and under what 
circumstances; the age and economic profile of potential returnees; and their lifestyle expectations, 
based on current living standards in their respective locations (KPMG, 2014a: 4). The team would 
also undertake desk-based research and visit the Chagos islands to ascertain their carrying capacity 
and resources (KPMG, 2014a: 4). The study spanned ten months, commencing in April 2014 with 
final reporting at the end of January 2015 (KPMG, 2014a: 1). 
 
Between us we attended almost all of KPMG’s consultation events with the Chagossian community 
in the UK.7 At the so-called ‘pre-consultation’ stage in July 2014, this included a large community 
meeting and a series of face-to-face meetings in Crawley, and a small community meeting in London. 
A participant sent us a written report of the community meeting in Manchester. We monitored 
KPMG’s outgoing reports and correspondence to stakeholders. We kept in regular contact with 
Chagossian community members and one of us joined a working group of Chagossian leaders, 
community members, and supporters, which met regularly to discuss the consultation process and 
plan the community’s response. Thus our position was not impartial: we openly and actively 
supported Chagossians’ efforts to clarify their situation and to pursue their self-identified goals. This 
positionality lent us an appreciation of two factors which, though not central in the material we 
present, are nevertheless important. Firstly, many Chagossians opted for non-participation for 
various reasons, including a lack of faith in the process and fatigue with the sense of history 
repeating itself. Secondly, Chagossians held diverse opinions about the content of the study (such as 
the level of living standards returnees should expect), which we do not detail here since our focus is 
on the consultation process. Following the publication of KPMG’s Draft Report in November 2014, 
we submitted a written response to KPMG (independent of and not representative of Chagossian 
                                                          
7 We did not attend corresponding events in Mauritius and Seychelles. 
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groups), and assisted in the preparation of the Chagossian working group’s response. KPMG held 
further consultation meetings with the community in Mauritius, Seychelles, and the UK in January 
2015. One of us attended and recorded the meeting in Crawley, and we received an audio recording 
of the meeting in Manchester. Through these activities we gained an exceptional overview of the 
public-facing aspects of the resettlement review process. 
 
The KPMG consultants took a generic, standardised approach to consultation, as emphasised by the 
resettlement specialist who repeatedly assured participants that she would use the ‘standard 
resettlement procedures’ drawn from a series of ‘international principles’ shared by most 
resettlement projects (cf. Stirrat, 2000). Such an approach is clearly valued also by the UK 
government, as reflected in its Consultation Principles (HMG, 2013). In the following sections, we 
consider some of the consequences of this approach, in light of the historical legacy of inadequate 
consultation of the Chagossian community. 
 
Obstacles to establishing trust in the consultants 
Given the long history of the UK Government failing (adequately) to consult the Chagossian 
community regarding political decisions directly affecting them, it was clear to observers that 
consultants employed by the UK Government would find it difficult to establish trust with 
community members. Prior to its inception, we asked several Chagossians what they thought of the 
FCO’s plan to conduct a feasibility study. Their responses were replete with mistrust and doubts 
about the genuineness of the exercise. As one Chagossian woman said of the FCO, 
 
I don’t trust them anymore because they always say the same thing. They lie. Every time 
they promise something then lie. I don’t trust anything they say. Only when they’ve actually 
done something will I be able to say it’s done (...) They have already made the decision. After 
all the things that have happened, I don’t believe in anything. 
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Several people felt that the study gave the impression of doing something to resolve the situation of 
the Chagossians, but carried no guarantees of any change; in the words of another Chagossian 
woman, ‘The FCO are not serious about that (...) It’s a joke. It’s only a feasibility study’.  
In the first pre-consultation meeting in Crawley, Chagossian audience members foregrounded the 
issue of trust. The KPMG project manager told the audience that he understood that they were 
‘suspicious’ but nevertheless hoped that they could see the consultation as ‘a fresh start’. The 
audience responded with scornful laughter, and one woman exclaimed that it was as if ‘we’ve got a 
wound and they stick, they keep digging knives into it, that’s all they’re doing… Year after year the 
same story… They keep taking us for fools’. Eventually, a Chagossian man summarised:  
 
We would like to let you finish and then we will ask you questions, but these ladies are 
expressing themselves because we no longer have faith and trust in anyone, including the 
government, but we’d like you to finish anyway.  
 
Later, another Chagossian man suggested:  
 
We can start with confidence between us ... we would like to know what are your strengths 
– not you personally, but you as KPMG … in this project – what are your strengths and your 
weaknesses, and that way we can build up trust with you. 
 
The KPMG project manager responded by describing his four colleagues in terms of their 
professional qualifications, and concluded: ‘So I can reassure you that it is a very, very capable and 
very experienced team for what is we understand an unusual assignment’.    
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Insufficient dissociation from the UK Government 
Participants in the UK expressed cynicism at the timing of the consultation, which was scheduled to 
conclude three months before the 2015 General Election. They feared that the exercise was a 
political tactic to win votes, but that no action would be taken until after the election, and every 
delay meant that there would be fewer native Chagos islanders able to return. Throughout the 
consultation process there was a lack of clarity about the relationships between the KPMG 
consultants and the UK Government. The consultants appeared to believe that certain signage – 
references to their expertise or position, and other verbal and non-verbal cues – would be sufficient 
to establish trust with the community. However, their signage was not always clear or recognisable 
to Chagossian participants. For example, the resettlement specialist assumed that her Canadian 
accent would signal that she did not belong to the British Establishment, but in fact many of the 
Kreol-speaking Chagossians listened to her presentation through a translator, and were unaware 
that she was not British. Not recognising the distinction between the FCO and KPMG, Chagossian 
audience members repeatedly posed questions about matters pertinent to the community – 
compensation, pensions, and immigration/citizenship rules – which were outside the study’s Terms 
of Reference. The consultants responded by asserting their inability to answer such questions and 
their distance from the government, with statements such as ‘we can make no promises, we can’t 
speak for the Foreign Office’. Audience members reacted to such evasion by demanding a different 
kind of personnel: one woman in Crawley said ‘we need people who can give us the answers’, while 
a man in Manchester requested that the consultants ‘ask the government to send one 
representative at least to clarify all them questions that you can’t answer’.  
 
Although the FCO and KPMG stressed that the feasibility study was to be conducted in an impartial 
manner by an independent party, there was a lack of distinction between the FCO and KPMG. The 
venues for the pre-consultation events were booked under ‘FCO/BIOT’, and sometimes had signs 
reading ‘FCO/BIOT’, indicating that the government, rather than external consultants, were the 
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hosts. Initially a civil servant from the BIOT administration distributed the KPMG monthly reports to 
stakeholders; it was not until halfway through the 10-month project that KPMG began to email 
reports to stakeholders directly. This opaqueness in the role and affiliation of the consultants 
contributed to concerns that they were not, in fact, impartial or trustworthy. It continued into the 
reporting phase, with KPMG using language in specific sections of its Draft Report – such as referring 
to the Chagossians as ‘former workers’ (KPMG, 2014b: Section 1.1.2) – consistent with the UK 
government’s position rather than that of independent consultants. Moreover, in the Draft Report 
KPMG (apparently unintentionally) identified as the UK Government by reprinting (but without 
quotation marks) a statement presumably from the UK Government, which read:  
 
The UK government has expressed its regret about the compulsory evacuation of 
Chagossians from BIOT in the late 1960s and early 1970s. We [sic] do not seek to justify 
those actions or excuse the conduct of an earlier generation (KPMG, 2014b: Section 1.1.2). 
 
Lack of continuity of personnel 
Another barrier to the establishment of trust was the consultants’ unfamiliarity with the Chagossian 
case. On the whole, the consultants possessed little a priori knowledge of the circumstances and 
history of the Chagossian community, and all but one were completely unknown to Chagossians.8 As 
the study progressed, consultants neglected opportunities to develop continuing relationships with 
the community: most of the consultation events were facilitated by two or three team members, but 
the same individuals rarely returned to conduct follow-up events. Indeed, the project assistant was 
the only individual who attended community events at both pre-consultation and reporting stages, 
so from the audience’s perspective there was almost no continuity of visible personnel. After the 
                                                          
8 The exception to this rule was the environmental specialist, whom Chagossian leaders identified as a problematic 
candidate at the study’s inception because of his connection with the Chagos Conservation Trust, an organisation 
perceived to be ‘anti-resettlement’, and because his work on Chagos was at the time limited (see 
http://www.chagossupport.org.uk/background/news-archive/march-2014-update).   
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submission of the Draft Report, the project manager left KPMG and was replaced by another KPMG 
consultant, but KPMG only communicated this to stakeholders several months after the fact (via a 
delayed monthly report). In other words, consultants were both ‘dropping in’ and ‘dropping out’ of 
the feasibility study. There was little sense of their credentials or identities, making it difficult to 
establish a relationship of trust with community members. 
 
Lack of transparency 
At the start of the ‘pre-consultation’ meeting in Crawley, one of the consultants handed out an 
attendance sheet without explaining its purpose. Most attendees passed it on to the next person 
without signing it, which surprised the KPMG team, although it should be understood in the context 
of concerns about signing forms in the absence of full information about their purpose, as outlined 
above. In any event, after discussing this with us, KPMG did not distribute an attendance sheet at 
the subsequent ‘pre-consultation’ meetings. Partway through the ‘pre-consultation’ meeting in 
Crawley (and earlier, in Mauritius), the consultants attempted to gather socio-economic information 
via a questionnaire without clearly explaining what information was being sought and how it would 
be used. Some community members reacted with concern. In Crawley, one man asked the 
consultants whether they had already started to complete the socio-economic questionnaire, 
without informing participants, during the consultation event: ‘have we started to ask these 
questions and complete this questionnaire? How can you complete the form with only 5% or so of 
the community here present?’ The resettlement specialist appeared somewhat affronted, and tried 
to reassure the audience that ‘this is pre-consultation, this is very standard and normal, we have 
plans to consult with other members of the community’. Consequently, there was a minor exodus of 
audience members who felt that the consultants were being opaque about their methods. Similarly, 
several Chagossian groups objected to the consultants’ plan to conduct exclusively women’s focus 
groups because they were concerned that this was another method for ‘divide and rule’. In the face 
of reluctance to participate, the consultants abandoned the socio-economic questionnaire and 
‘We no longer have faith and trust in anyone’:  
Misadventures in community consultation on the future of the Chagos Archipelago 
 
18 
 
women’s focus groups altogether rather than taking the more transparent approach of seeking to 
justify their rationales and, if necessary, adapting the generic templates to make them more 
appropriate to the specific context. 
 
Practical obstacles to participation 
Expanding and contracting timescales 
The UK Government Consultation Principles state that if a consultation exercise is to take place over 
all or part of a holiday period (e.g. summer or Christmas), policy-makers should consider what 
impact there may be and take mitigating action, and take into consideration the capacity of 
consultees to respond (HMG, 2013: 2). They also highlight the importance of taking steps to engage 
effectively with hard to reach or vulnerable groups and ensuring that information is disseminated in 
a way that is likely to be useful and accessible to interested parties (HMG, 2013: 2). As noted above, 
the KPMG consultants agreed to work to a strict deadline, carrying out key activities at particular 
stages. In practice, timescales both expanded and contracted: there were severe delays in some 
activities, and others were sprung on intended participants at very short notice. As Griffiths (2014) 
has observed for other vulnerable migrant groups, having to constantly negotiate conflicting 
temporalities – including waiting, stagnation, rushing, and unexpected events – produces instability 
and powerlessness. 
 
On the one hand, KPMG’s ‘monthly reports’ were consistently 2-3 months late, which gave the 
impression of a lack of organisation and produced difficulties for stakeholders in planning for 
consultation events. On the other hand, KPMG confirmed the dates, times, and locations of 
consultation events with a few days’ notice. For example, when KPMG announced in December that 
the study team would meet with the community on 5 January, Chagossian leaders responded that 
this date would not be suitable, as many families travel to Mauritius or Seychelles to celebrate New 
Year with their extended families. Initially KPMG refused to change the date, but eventually 
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postponed by one week. Five days before the event, the project assistant emailed the leader of the 
main Chagossian group in the UK to inform her of the details of the meeting, but he did not notify 
any other leaders, community members, or supporters. While the consultants inevitably faced 
difficulties in planning precise dates and times in advance, such obstacles were also confronted by 
community members, who had to rearrange schedules at the last minute in order to participate in 
the consultation events. The consequence of lack of communication was apparent at the final 
meeting in January 2015: approximately 60 Chagossians attended, half the number present at the 
first (‘pre-consultation’) event in Crawley. 
 
Now you see it, now you don’t 
A second obstacle to participation was an actual lack of opportunity to participate. In its May report, 
KPMG stated that consultation would include: a series of community meetings, gender focus groups, 
key stakeholder meetings and one-on-one interviews, a socio-economic questionnaire, and the 
elicitation of written submissions and emails. The June monthly report stated that further 
consultation work was expected to take place from June–September, including focus groups and 
discussions with community leaders to explore how to continue the consultation process. From the 
beginning, the community was primed for an extended period of consultation involving numerous 
structured methods. 
 
The first meetings with the community in July were described by the consultants as ‘pre-consultation 
meetings’ and ‘the first round’ of consultations. The project manager explained that they were an 
opportunity for him to introduce the study team and the work being undertaken, for the 
resettlement specialist to lead a discussion around the kinds of concerns and issues likely to be 
involved in the resettlement process, and for community members to ask questions and to raise 
issues or concerns about KPMG’s work and the resettlement process. As the project manager stated 
in Crawley, ‘today, for us, this is pre-consultation – this is our first opportunity to meet with you – 
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and there will be a lot more follow-up work to take place in the coming weeks’; ‘We are happy to 
come down and spend as much time in Crawley as is necessary in the coming weeks’. At the 
conclusion of the London ‘pre-consultation’ event, one Chagossian man emphasised that there 
needed to be ‘more discussion’ with the Chagossian community. The project manager handed out 
his business cards and welcomed further communication. Also in London, the resettlement specialist 
explained that ‘these consultations, informal and formal, will proceed, some of them with smaller 
working groups that we’re going to meet up until the end of November’. Thus the consultants made 
commitments to move beyond the so-called ‘pre-consultation’ phase and provide the community 
with more opportunities to share their views. 
 
However, the consultants did not in fact return to conduct follow-up consultations prior to the 
production of the Draft Report. From mid-July until December communication with the community 
was sporadic. At multiple working group meetings Chagossian leaders reported that KPMG had not 
responded to emails (including the invitation to tailor the socio-economic questionnaire to make it 
more appropriate to the community). KPMG did not inform the community that the further 
consultations previously promised for autumn 2014 would not take place. As a result, people who 
had been unable to attend the ‘pre-consultation events’ or had not been granted face-to-face 
appointments were suddenly and inexplicably deprived of their chance to participate in the process.9 
The abandonment of promised consultation and absence of communication to this effect together 
demonstrate unreliability, lack of transparency, and limited understanding about obstacles to 
participation. 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Email submissions were possible in principle, but this method was not suitable for everyone, particularly those without 
access to the internet or with limited (English, Kreol or computer) literacy. 
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Keeping up appearances: first misrepresentation and then omission  
KPMG’s reporting of the consultation process was met with surprise by those who had observed it. 
Meetings with the community that KPMG had previously described as ‘pre-consultation meetings’ 
were suddenly described in the Draft Report as ‘structured consultation events’ (KPMG, 2014b: 
Section 2.1.2), with no justification for the change in terminology. The Draft Report also stated that 
fieldwork entailed ‘face-to-face consultation events and the use of structured questionnaires to 
survey the Chagossians resident in the UK, Seychelles and Mauritius’ (KPMG, 2014b: Section 3.2). It 
continued: 
 
Socio-economic questionnaire: the questionnaire was designed to capture information 
about the Chagossian community on employment, views on education, health and the 
environment, and expectations about what resettlement might look like. This information 
obtained would enable the study team to better understand the Chagossian community and 
their expectations regarding resettlement (KPMG, 2014b: 3.2.1) 
 
While strictly correct in specifying the intended use of the questionnaire, the statement is 
misguiding in omitting the fact that the questionnaire was abandoned in practice. Similarly, the Draft 
Report stated: 
 
Gender focus group guide: recognising the diverse needs and experiences of women and 
trying to establish an environment in which women are as comfortable to be as open as 
possible, a gender focus group guide was developed. Due to the communities’ [sic] belief 
that men and women shouldn’t be interviewed separately, the offer of the gender focus 
group meeting was declined (KPMG, 2014b: Section 3.2.1). 
 
Again, this does not accurately reflect the community’s resistance, as discussed above. 
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KPMG invited responses to the Draft Report, and our response, which summarised a number of the 
issues covered above, seems to have been taken on board. The Final Report was updated and the 
misleading sections amended, with one exception: a sentence which reads ‘we undertook (...) 
fieldwork which involved consultation events and the use of structured questionnaires to survey the 
Chagossians resident in the UK, Seychelles and Mauritius’ (KPMG, 2015: Section 2.2). Rather than 
substituting the previous detailed, inaccurate descriptions of the methodology used with equally 
detailed but accurate descriptions of what transpired, the consultants simply replaced them with 
more general, unspecific summaries. The account of the process presented in the Final Report is 
therefore neither fuller nor more transparent than that presented in the Draft Report. 
These misadventures in consultation presented the Chagossian community with a dilemma in the 
reporting phase: whether to highlight the problematic aspects of the consultation process and risk 
the de-legitimation of a report whose finding was that there are no fundamental obstacles to 
resettlement; or to accept that while imperfect, the consultation process was sufficient for the 
consultants to reach informed, valid conclusions in their report. Many agreed that time was of the 
essence: with the population of native Chagos islanders in rapid decline, people ought to focus on 
the outcome – to fight for the government to act on the report’s findings and facilitate resettlement 
– rather than dwell on the process. 
 
After consultation … further consultation 
The feasibility study, published in January 2015, provided cost estimates for three different types of 
resettlement, and concluded broadly that there are no insurmountable legal or environmental 
barriers to resettlement (KPMG, 2015). In March 2015, a month before the General Election, the 
FCO announced that ‘the study found there was not a clear indication of likely demand for 
resettlement’, that ‘costs and liabilities to the UK taxpayer were uncertain’ and that ‘further work 
‘We no longer have faith and trust in anyone’:  
Misadventures in community consultation on the future of the Chagos Archipelago 
 
23 
 
should proceed to address these fundamental uncertainties’ to facilitate decision-making.10 Rather 
than conceding that KPMG had fallen short of meeting the agreed Terms of Reference and were thus 
responsible for any uncertainties in the study’s findings, the statement implied that the findings 
were a reliable and objective account of uncertainties ‘out there’ (presumably residing with the 
Chagossian community). The validity of the consultation process was maintained and a justification 
made for yet further investigative work, which rationalised the UK Government’s decision not to 
conclude the policy review before the General Election, after which the Chagossians fell off the 
political agenda (again). In August 2015, the nature of this further investigative work became clearer, 
when the FCO’s anonymous ‘BIOT Policy Review Team’ circulated a Policy Review Document and a 
questionnaire to stakeholders.11 The Document explained that the UK Government was now seeking 
views on: how many Chagossians wish to resettle Chagos, the UK Government’s assessment of the 
likely costs and liabilities to the UK taxpayer, and alternatives to resettlement. Respondents were 
given 12 weeks to return completed questionnaires, and the opportunity to attend community and 
one-to-one meetings with BIOT officials. One of the UK Government’s own principles for 
consultation exercises emphasise the importance of ‘increasing the level of transparency’, and 
‘bringing to bear expertise and alternative perspectives’ in order to identify ‘unintended effects and 
practical problems’ (HMG 2013: 1). Had the previous consultation exercise(s) been conducted in 
accordance with such principles, and not, as we have seen, characterised by opacity and even 
misrepresentation and misreporting, these additional consultation exercises and the associated 
costs to both the Chagossian community in particular and the taxpayer in general may have been 
avoided. Our hope is that our own monitoring of the process has both demonstrated the importance 
of this principle, and contributed analytical and practical insights into the community consultation 
process to inform future governmental decision-making. 
                                                          
10 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/progress-in-reviewing-policy-on-resettlement-of-the-british-indian-ocean-
territory  
11 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/450997/BIOT_Policy_Review_of_Resettl
ement_Consultation_Document_Final.pdf  
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Conclusion: lack of confidence in consultation 
In this article, we have brought together critiques of participatory methods with social science work 
on trust to show how a failure by consultants to engage with histories of marginalisation, 
misrecognition, and mistrust can lead to selective participation and barriers to genuine participation 
within disadvantaged and marginalised communities. In our case study, the Chagossian community 
was being asked to trust FCO officials and KPMG consultants by providing them with information 
whose uses they could not control. Yet trust in others requires reciprocity, a shared future, the 
possibility of sanctions when expectations are not fulfilled, and a confidence that others will not 
exploit one’s vulnerability. In applying standardised principles and practices which were assumed to 
map onto the specific stakeholder group, the consultants failed to recognise the historical legacy of 
non-consultation, and appeared to assume that Chagossians would be grateful for the opportunity 
to be consulted and ready to ‘start afresh’. They assumed that their signage concerning their 
(independent) position and intentions would be sufficient to establish trust with the community, but 
the signs were often indecipherable. The unpredictability of communications and consultation 
events, and the lack of appropriate opportunities to participate, presented further obstacles to 
participation.  
 
From the time of its inception, there was much speculation within the Chagossian community, and 
between community members and their supporters, about the motivations behind the feasibility 
study and whether it could lead to any positive change for the community. Some individuals 
withdrew from the process, some engaged in selective participation, and others took up every 
available opportunity to participate, but for everyone we spoke to the decision of whether and how 
to participate required careful consideration. There is little ethnographic evidence that in the course 
of the process trust was established between Chagossians and the consultants. It is clear, however, 
that Chagossians were constrained in their critique of the process; some felt that public disapproval 
would run the risk of further delays which would hamper resettlement. Contrary to the assumptions 
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of policy-makers and some scholars, consultation was not universally empowering for community 
members but rather highlighted power differentials between the FCO/KPMG and the community, 
and the latter’s vulnerability. This case suggests that consultation is neither merely a means to an 
end nor a discrete event, but becomes incorporated into the life, dynamics, and history of a 
community.  As this paper has shown, in contexts where consultation may not be an apposite, fair or 
effective method to use, as the  stakeholders constitute a chronically disadvantaged and 
marginalised group, collaboration and empowerment may be more appropriate methods.  
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